Social Democracy, the First World War and the Working Class in Britain

The Working Class and the First World War: It is still Nation v. Class

Given this year’s barrage of state-sponsored propaganda over the First World War — a barrage which is set to continue long beyond the hundredth anniversary of its outbreak — we are republishing a document which has been long out of print. Originally published in Internationalist Communist Review in 1993, it was written at a particularly bleak time for the working class, especially in the long-established capitalist heartlands. Here ruthless economic restructuring had already pulverised whole sections of the industrial working class. The ‘new economy’ was already dominated by services and a new generation of flexible wage slaves brought up to believe that a working class with its own distinct interests opposed to those of capital was an outlandish notion left over from a bygone past. This triumphant capitalist ideology was of course reinforced by the collapse of the state-capitalist Russian bloc which ended the Cold War and which in the popular mind meant the defeat of ‘socialism’. The level of capitalist jubilation was summed up by one Francis Fukuyama whose 1992 book coined the term “the end of history”. His message that capitalism and Western liberal democracy marked the end point of human history was seized on and popularised by the media, at any rate in the West.

But history, as Marx was well aware, has no vital goal of its own. History is the product of class society and class struggle and its outcome is not preordained. No sooner had the end of history been proclaimed than the world began to realise that even when capitalism holds sway throughout the globe this does not mean the exclusive domination of ‘liberal democracy’ (i.e. the United States), much less the disappearance of the profitability crisis which had beset the world since 1971 and certainly not the disappearance of imperialist tensions and rivalry. First came the destruction of the Twin Towers and the unlikely challenge of Islamic jihadism from those who had been erstwhile allies of the US, a challenge which was used as the excuse for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, an act above all designed to secure US control of oil flows and the consolidation of the dollar as the instrument for its international trade. Then, in 2008 came the spectacular bursting of the financial bubble fuelled by banks and financial fund managers borrowing against unimaginable amounts of fictitious capital. Since then the capitalists’ confidence in their bankrupt system (not just the banks) has been maintained by the illusion that state intervention to provide even more fictitious capital will keep the good times rolling, even as investment in the creation of new value continues to decline. Yet it is not the capitalists who are bearing the brunt of the crisis. As always it is the wage working class who are being told to work harder for less reward, to expect less and less in the way of welfare benefits; to accept that more people will be left without the means to live; in short to put up with everything that capitalism throws at them because this is the best of all possible worlds.

Meanwhile, as trade in today’s globalised capitalism flows more freely than at any time since before the First World War, ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ has grown to challenge the supremacy of the USA, particularly in the Pacific. The parallel between the rise of Germany and the increased economic weight of the United States which threatened Britain and her empire before the First World War is being increasingly drawn. It is not the only comparison that is being made. Today the gulf between the richest and the poorest in the ‘advanced’ capitalist world is bigger than at any time since 1914. Without over-extending the parallels, the contemporary world situation resembles the run-up to 1914 in several key aspects. First, a global profitability crisis for capitalism which demands the destruction of capital values on a scale far beyond even the most dramatic domestic restructuring. Second, the sharpening of old and new imperialist rivalries. Third, the diminishing share of ‘national wealth’ accruing to the working class, a fact which accounted for the “repeated outbreak of serious strikes” (Arthur Marwick), not just in Britain but in all major capitalist states in the run-up to the First World War.

Of course this latter point begs the question as to why so many workers supported the war when it broke out. The powerful hold of social democracy over broad layers of the working class can hardly be over-estimated. The 2nd International had resolved to oppose a European war should it break out. The article here is an attempt to explain how social democracy’s support for the war (and here we include the Labour Party) was not an inexplicable act of treachery towards the working class but a consequence of its inability to understand that the capitalist state represents the interests of capital which are fundamentally opposed to the interests of the working class. Today, as yesterday, attempts to ‘democratise’ capitalist state institutions only foster illusions and throw obstacles in the road towards workers recognising that they owe no allegiance to their ‘nation state’. On the contrary, the only way to resist the increasing sacrifices that the state is demanding of the working class is solidarity with workers everywhere to overthrow the existing world order. In 1914 this might have seemed an unrealistic goal. By October 1917 the working class in Russia held out a revolutionary way out of the nightmare of capitalism’s first global war for workers in the rest of the world. That project found only a dim echo and ultimately failed. The isolation of the Russian working class not only destroyed that revolution but for ever afterwards has spawned the lie that Stalinism was socialism. But the fact remains that the option of taking the revolutionary road was presented to the world’s workers. Revolutions, strikes and mutinies broke out across Europe and the wider world from Seattle to Shanghai. It was enough to make the capitalist classes tremble but not enough to bring them down. Against the tide of propaganda telling us that despite all its horrors, ‘The Great War’ is justified because without it we would not be ‘who we are today’, we should remind ourselves that history has no predetermined outcomes. With capitalism offering us only more austerity, and with imperialist rivalries once again on the rise the same question posed at the start of the last century is still with us. “Socialism or barbarism” is the historic choice confronting humanity still.

Social Democracy, the First World War and the Working Class in Britain

For Marxists the 1st World War marks a watershed in capitalism’s history. Unlike previous wars this war encompassed the entire globe. It was a direct outcome of the imperialist rivalry amongst the ‘great powers’ — a rivalry which was not simply the result of bellicose policies on the part of particular governments but an inevitable consequence of the process of capital accumulation. By the beginning of the 20th century the concentration and centralisation of capital had reached monopoly proportions and the ‘purely’ economic competition between firms inside national boundaries was more and more becoming competition between national capitals where the lines between economic, political and military interests merged into a single interest: the interest of the state.

In short, as Lenin was the first to point out, capitalism had reached a new stage in its development from which there could be no going back. With its economic laws now operating on a world scale the system’s cyclical crises could no longer be resolved by the old means of bankruptcies, shut-downs and take-overs. Henceforward a much more massive devaluation of capital would be required; the kind of devaluation that can only come with the wholesale destruction and rundown of constant capital associated with modern warfare.

For the working class too the 1st World War also marks a watershed. For those who had eyes to see, it proved the impossibility of capitalism being peacefully and gradually transformed into socialism. The absurdity of the idea that the same expansionary forces which had led to capitalist imperialism would go on to usher capital towards some sort of centralised world system where war was a thing of the past was staring the workers’ movement in the face. Few chose to face up to this. On the contrary, when war finally broke out in 1914 the 2nd International collapsed as the majority of its affiliated parties abandoned any pretence at proletarian internationalism. In truth though, despite its pledges to wage “war on war” in the run up to 1914, the 2nd International had never been able to reach agreement on what the international working class should do in the increasingly likely event of an inter-imperialist war.

Imperialist War and the 2nd International

Only a minority — associated with the figures of Lenin and Luxemburg — actually regarded such a war as an opportunity for the working class to overthrow capital. In 1907 for example, they had managed to get a further paragraph added to the resolution on war adopted by the International Socialist Congress which met at Stuttgart. It read as follows:

"In case war should break out anyway, it is their (the working class’) duty to intervene in favour of its speedy termination and with all their powers to utilise the economic and political crisis created by the war to rouse the masses and thereby to hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule.(1)"

Yet, as the opening words of this sentence imply, the majority of the 2nd International were not seriously considering the possibility of war actually happening, much less the possibility of the working class seizing the opportunity to “hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule”. A predominant aspect of social democratic thinking was the belief that the democratising of existing society would inevitably lead to the proletariat gaining political power (since it was assumed that the working class would be the majority in an advanced capitalist society) and thereby to socialism. The advent of socialism was seen as the logical follow-up to the democratic revolution. And inside the stronghold of social democracy, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), this was a ‘revolution’ which an increasing number of social democrats assumed would come via the ballot box. This, despite the fundamentally undemocratic system of Germany under the Kaiser. In fact there was compelling evidence that sooner or later those holding political power in Germany would have to take account of the electoral strength of the working class — or else go under. By 1912 the SPD could boast that it had 110 seats out of 397 in the Reichstag — the result of 4.5 million votes at the polls. But it is one thing for capital to be pressurised into conceding political reforms, it is another for the working class itself to take hold of political power and overthrow capitalism altogether.

Yet what today seems glaringly obvious was not so apparent to those who lived under autocratic regimes such as Wilhelmine Germany or, even worse, Tsarist Russia. The institution of bourgeois democracy — some sort of parliamentary system with possibly a constitutional monarchy — would have involved a revolution in the political make-up of these states. Whilst such a revolution was inconceivable in Russia with the forcible overthrow of the Tsar, in more capitalistically advanced Germany the peaceful transformation of the capitalist state came to be seen as a distinct possibility by the ‘revisionist’ rightwing of the SPD. Strictly speaking this did not involve a direct split between reformists and revolutionaries, at any rate from the standpoint of the proletarian revolution. The issue at stake was the bourgeois democratic, not the socialist revolution. Kautsky, for example, did not suppose that the political system of Wilhelmine Germany could be peacefully transformed and in this sense he was an anti-revisionist. Yet he came to theorise that the centripetal forces of international capital would eventually lead to a ‘supra-imperialist’ capitalist world where wars would be unnecessary and which would furnish the basis for international socialism. By implication of course international socialism would be instituted piecemeal and peaceably, but the full import of this was not clear. For the present — that is until 1914, the distinction between the long-term maximum programme (socialism) and the minimum programme (immediate reforms) enabled social democrats to hold on to the illusion that revisionists, reformists and revolutionaries alike were all working for the same ultimate goal.

Illusion it was though; an illusion fostered by the apparent unanimity of the forces of the 2nd International against war and their very real ability to mobilise workers in anti-war demonstrations. During the first Balkan War (1912) the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) issued an anti-war manifesto which recognised that “the Balkan conflict can at any time become a general conflict” and appealed to the proletariat of Europe to “take action against war and against the spread of the Balkan conflict … with its whole organisational might, with mass action.” Even before the manifesto was published on 29th October, 1912 there were massive demonstrations in Germany. On 20th October 150,000 workers had demonstrated in Berlin alone and mass demonstrations spread throughout Europe. On 17th November — following the request of the SPD — large-scale protests were organised in all European capitals where there were parties affiliated to the International.

"On this occasion representatives of various socialist parties, Jaurès and Renner in Berlin, MacDonald, Vandervelde and Scheidemann in Paris, spoke up and warned governments that ‘they shall not set Europe ablaze with impunity’ … In Pré-Saint-Gervais near Paris over 100,000 people demonstrated. ‘We are not powerless’, the whole socialist press said again and again, ‘because the rulers will not wage war if they realise that the people do not want war.’(2)"

Against this background an extraordinary Congress of the ISB was held at Basle. In the words of Jean Longuet (French right-wing Socialist), it was intended to be “a powerful demonstration of the unity of the socialist movement in the anti-war struggle, a harmonious expression of the power of the International”. Yet, despite the rhetoric and heady atmosphere generated at Basle, the social democrats were further away than ever from agreeing a concrete strategy in the event of war actually breaking out. The overwhelming emphasis at the Basle Congress was the prevention of war by putting pressure on governments. Alexandra Kollontai (then a Menshevik) recorded her impressions of the Congress in a letter,

"One felt the need to frighten Europe, to threaten it with the ‘red spectre’, revolution, in case the governments should risk a war. And standing on the table which served as a platform I did threaten Europe … It was tremendous, you know, the protest of the peoples against war, and Jaurè’s marvellous voice, and the wonderful and hoary old head of my beloved Keir Hardie, and the great organ, and the revolutionary songs, the meetings … I am still dizzy with all I have lived through.(3)"

Not only did the majority regard the prospect of proletarian revolution as a means of threatening governments rather than something to be directly worked for, at Basle the ISB resolved to step up the anti-war campaign by “ever more energetic propaganda, by ever firmer protests” which would be extended to include the middle class and pacifists in general alongside the working class. In other words, working class action against war was to be limited to demonstrations and turned into a populist movement. Any notion that imperialist war was intrinsic to capitalism was quietly rejected. The establishment of a peaceful capitalism via disarmament, not socialism via revolution was now the International’s express aim. Accordingly the ISB rejected out of hand Luxemburg’s proposed amendment on mass action to the draft Basle manifesto. This read as follows:

"This action must be strengthened in form and in intensity as the threat of war increases so that in the event of the ultimate calamity it can culminate in decisive revolutionary mass action.(4)"

Similarly, opposition by Pannekoek, Radek and Lensch to the working class aligning itself with middle class pacifists went unheard, as did their critique that the International’s policy of urging capitalism to disarm was utopian. Although the ISB continued to call for socialists to organise meetings and demonstrations right up to the beginning of the war, once this policy of threatening governments with revolution had inevitably failed and war finally broke out, nationalism proved to be the strongest sentiment within the ranks of social democracy.

"The ruling classes’ fear of a proletarian revolution as the sequel of a world war has proved to be a real guarantee of peace." (Basle Manifesto, 1912)

When the war finally did begin, amongst the social democratic parliamentary representatives of the belligerent countries only the Serbians voted against war credits while in Russia the Menshevik and Bolshevik deputies (to Lenin’s anger) abstained. As Schorske has put it for German Social Democracy:

"The slogan ‘To this system, no man and no penny’ was finally abandoned for the slogan which had competed with it since 1907: In the hour of danger we shall not leave the Fatherland in the lurch.(5)"

In France, Guesde and in Belgium, Vandervelde — leader of the Socialist Party and President of the ISB — joined capitalist war cabinets soon after the war began. Labour stalwarts, Arthur Henderson and J.H. Thomas in Britain joined Lloyd-George’s Cabinet in May 1915.

Imperialist War and the British Working Class

Revolutionary Marxists have tended to explain mass working class support for the 1st World War in terms of the betrayal of socialism by the leaders. Clearly this has more than a little bearing on the situation in Germany where thousands of young recruits went off to war singing social democratic songs, having been assured by the SPD leadership that this was a war of legitimate national defence against attack from the bête noir of the International, reactionary Russian Tsarism.

In Britain however the Labour Party, as distinct from the Independent Labour Party (ILP), was composed largely of trade unionists who generally made no claim at all to be socialist or else Fabians who rejected outright the idea of proletarian revolution and supposed that socialism had something to do with the extension of state (i.e. the capitalist state) control over society. In any case the Marxist conception of socialism coming about through class struggle was anathema to Labourites who, in the words of Engels, acted politically as the tail of the Liberal Party while the thought that “workers have no fatherland’ (Communist Manifesto) never entered their heads.

Amongst this working class which “think about politics in general the same as the bourgeois think” (Engels, 1882) there was no shortage of cannon fodder for British imperialism. Only five weeks into the 1st World War 175,000 men had responded to Kitchener’s Call to Arms. In all the voluntary system lasted until the end of 1915 and brought 2.5 million recruits. The majority were working class and many left relatively well-paid jobs to go to the war front. In the coal industry, for example,

"…191,170 trade unionists, almost a fifth of the total labour force, had joined the armed forces by February 1915.(6)"

In the early days, at any rate, there was undoubtedly popular enthusiasm for war, an enthusiasm which was encouraged by trade union and Labour leaders who not only agreed to suspend the class struggle during the war but encouraged workers to risk sacrificing their lives by urging them “to rise to the national crisis”.

The widespread support for the war amongst the working class cannot be explained simply in terms of a desire for adventure and a change from the monotony of work and life at home. Nor is unemployment a satisfactory answer. Working class volunteers did not come exclusively from the ranks of the unemployed. With 20 per cent of the male population of prime military age (20-35) voluntarily responding to appeals “to help your country at this critical moment”, it is clear that patriotic values pervaded the British working class as much as the rest of society.

"Imperialist ideology also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from the other classes." (Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism)

And patriotism was part of imperialist ideology: an ideology which, as Lenin later put it, “also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from the other classes”. (Imperialism, The Highest stage of Capitalism.) Today this may appear obvious. It was not so obvious in August 1914. In the first place, despite Lenin’s use of the "workers have no fatherland” slogan to emphasise the betrayal of the 2nd International, there had by no means been an established anti-patriotic principle within Social Democracy. If anything, it was assumed that the interests of the working class represented the interests of the nation (i.e. in the sense of the majority of the ‘people’), no matter that ‘the nation’ was increasingly identifying itself with the imperialist state. Thus, Rosa Luxemburg could still couch her attack on the German Social Democrats’ failure to oppose the war in terms of their “desertion of the fatherland”.

"Yes, Socialists should defend their country in great historical crises … the highest duty of the Social Democracy toward its fatherland demanded that it expose the real background of this imperialist war, that it rend the net of imperialist and diplomatic lies that covers the eyes of the people. It was their duty to speak loudly and clearly, to proclaim to the people of Germany that in this war victory and defeat would be equally fatal, to oppose the gagging of the fatherland by a state of siege, to demand that the people alone decide on war and peace, to demand a permanent session of Parliament for the period of the war, to assume a watchful control over the government by parliament, and over parliament by the people, to demand the immediate removal of all political inequalities, since only a free people can adequately govern its country, and finally, to oppose to the imperialist war, based as it was upon the most reactionary forces in Europe, the programme of Marx, of Engels and Lassalle. _

That was the flag that should have waved over the country. That would have been truly national, truly free, in harmony with the best traditions of Germany and the international class policy of the proletariat.(7)"

Here in a nutshell is the Social Democratic conception of internationalism: a coming together of distinct nations or peoples, not the overcoming of nationalist sentiments within the working class through a common struggle against capital which of necessity extends beyond national frontiers. It was a conception which had its roots in radical democracy and in Britain, in an even earlier period of capital’s development. Here too, but particularly in England, there had been a tradition of radical patriotism inside the working class.

It was a tradition which reached back before the French Revolution and incorporated populist myths such as the liberty enjoyed by the English people in Saxon times, under “Good King Alfred” before the imposition of the “Norman yoke”; and variations of the “God is an Englishman” idea invoked by a strand in radical Protestantism from the English Revolution onwards. By the 18th century the radical patriot would probably have defined himself as a “freeborn Englishman” who had a constitutional right to liberty; a right which was being usurped by a corrupt and tyrannical government in favour of an aristocracy which hailed from abroad. As the century progressed ‘patriotism’ became so much identified with radical opposition to government, especially extra-parliamentary opposition, that it was no longer regarded as a respectable attribute by the establishment. In the 1755 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary, for example, a ‘patriot’ is described as “One whose ruling passion is the love of his country”. Twenty years on, after mounting calls for a radical reform led by figures such as John Cartwright (who wrote a pamphlet whose demands prefigured those of the Chartists), this definition was replaced by the famous aphorism that “patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel”.— A ‘scoundrel’ presumably being someone who took the struggle for a representative parliament and against corrupt government to the populace as a whole. By the time of the French Revolution there was a thriving radical movement ready to absorb Paine’s ideas on the Rights of Man and the Revolution’s notions of democratic government.

The freeborn Englishman merged with the bourgeois democrat in a popular movement for radical parliamentary reform. The artisans and wage labourers who were at its head articulated their political aims through Corresponding Societies and clubs like the Manchester Patriotic Society, comprising “mechaniks of the lowest class”. The calls for the restoration of “Ancient Liberties” mingled with declarations about being “Citizens of the World”. This particular blend of English radical democratic patriotism survived in working class political life through until Chartism, when:

"Once again there were Patriotic Societies and Patriotic newspapers. Chartist leaders, particularly if they had suffered imprisonment, were the "distinguished patriots” , "the noble-minded patriots”, the “liberated patriots" (McDouall and Collins), “one of the greatest patriots the world ever saw” (0’ Connor), "one of the most unflinching patriots of the world” (Fletcher) or simply the "PATRIOT LOVETT”.(8)"

Yet it was a concept which never belonged exclusively to the radical democrats and which was always ambiguous. The ‘true patriot’ was just as likely to invoke images of the Roast Beef of Old England (which tune was played at the Manchester dinner to celebrate the release of imprisoned Chartists McDouall and Collins) as the internationalism espoused by Harney and the Fraternal Democrats. Both sets of imagery could and were absorbed by the existing parties of the political establishment as part of the process of undermining the threatening aspects of the radical movement. Liberalism, for instance, took over the old working class internationalism with its campaigns against autocracy and tyrannical government abroad. The Tories, on the other hand, skilfully used the sort of patriotism espoused by Cobbett or O’Connor as they peddled the image of England as the home of freedom whose benefits should be spread to less fortunate nations.

This notion of patriotism was easy to tie in with John Bullish, ‘little Englander’ Toryism. Like all historical processes, the ideological undermining of radicalism was not a clear cut affair but there was a turning point somewhere in the 1870s when, round about the same time as the Workmen’s Peace Association was entreating the Foreign Office, “... to use your utmost influence in Favour of Neutrality in the horrible War between Russia & Turkey, and alsow against any increased expendeture on our armaments”(9), G.H. MacDermott was launching what would become known as the ‘jingo Song’ round Britain’s Music Halls (by this time a potent source of Tory propaganda). This became the most well-known of a host of similar patriotic songs which expressed the Tories’‚ pro-Turkish policy (i.e. the fear that Russia might gain naval access to the Mediterranean) in popular form. It ran as follows,

"We don't want to fight, but by jingo if we do, _

We've got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve _

got the money too. _

We've fought the bear before, and while we’ re _

Britons true, _

The Russians will not have Constantinople.(10)"

Well before 1914 patriotism had become inextricably bound up with an imperialistic world view which was by no means the exclusive preserve of jingoistic Toryism but which extended across the political spectrum and throughout society. Already, in 1881 Lord Roseberry was countering the Liberals’ traditional antipathy to imperial aggrandisement by redefining ‘imperialism’ as ‘patriotism’. (“I mean the greater pride in Empire which is called Imperialism, a larger patriotism.”) During the 1895 election campaign, Roseberry declared himself a ‘Liberal lmperialist’, defined as:

"First, the maintenance of the Empire; secondly, the opening of new areas for our surplus population; thirdly, the suppression of the slave trade; fourthly, the development of missionary enterprise; and fifthly, the development of our commerce, which so often needs it.(11)"

Whether cast in terms of militaristic territorial expansion or the reluctant shouldering of the white man’s burden, the Empire had come to be regarded as almost an intrinsic part of Britain. By 1914 patriotism and imperialism were interdependent. A new ideological consensus had been forged in response to the changing international economic and political context in which Britain and her Empire found itself. Increasingly capitalist competition was becoming rivalry between states. Imperialist ideology was not just about hanging on to or even extending Britain’s existing overseas possessions but, as with all the other ‘Great Powers’, involved identification of the nation with the interests of the state. In the early years of the twentieth century this dominant ideology came more and more to be associated with Empire loyalty.

It was not just about patriotism but involved militarism, the cult of royalty and national heroes, and social Darwinism. After the Boer War in particular imperialist ideology became bound up with statism and national efficiency: the need for a strong economy to combat foreign commercial and industrial competition; the need for a strong army and navy to combat the growing military strength of rival states; and the need to reduce infant mortality since the birth rate was now seen as a matter of national importance. Children were a “national asset”, “the capital of a country” on whom “the future of the country and Empire” depended. It was a world view many of whose aspects were shared by Conservatives, Liberals, Liberal imperialists, Fabians, as well as a large number of trade unionists, Labourists and socialists.

By the late 19th century patriotism had become a key aspect of the ideology of the imperialist state. The weight of that ideology over the working class was immense. Empire propaganda permeated almost every aspect of workers’ lives — from the school text book to cigarette cards and imperial exhibitions which linked British capitalism’s success to imperialism; from the mass circulation popular press to music hall turns and songs; from children’s literature to everyday advertising and commemorative knick-knacks. It was an ideology that was sometimes unconsciously, but often consciously propagated amongst the working class as an antidote to class conflict: a world view which assumed unity of the ‘national interest’ and where individuals, not classes stood in equal relationship to each other and the state. The ease with which this ruling class ideology was transmitted through the bulk of the working class is undoubtedly linked to the development of a commercial, mass culture — part of a process more complicated than simply the ‘bribery’ of the upper strata of the working class with some of the material rewards of imperialism. The consolidation of the bourgeoisie’s ideological hold over the working class through the eradication and replacement of relatively autonomous elements of popular, working class life was not simply the result of technological advance. Rather, the latter stemmed from the necessity to maintain profitability by producing for ever-wider markets. Before the mass market came into being the more autonomous aspects of the popular press had to be either destroyed or absorbed and redefined. For example, the launch of the first mass circulation newspaper, the Daily Mail (which reached a circulation of 700,000 in four years) in 1896 was only possible once the old radical press had disappeared or been marginalised.

"The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas…" (Marx, The German Ideology)

After the defeat of Ch