(From Prometeo Series IV # 10, December 1986 - Translated by the CWO in 2006)
1986 is a year of anniversaries and memories which, though sad, are rich in lessons for the proletariat: it is the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Spanish Civil War, and the thirtieth of the movements in Poland and Hungary. It is also the thirtieth anniversary of another event of great significance in post-war history: that of Suez. The Party has already dedicated talks and debates in its central office in Milan to the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Spanish Civil War, as well as an article on the inside pages of _Battaglia Comunista_ No 12. In this issue we are devoting our attention to the events of Poland and Hungary.
Necessity forces us to remember those days in October and November 1956 since we have to reply to, and combat, the clouds of bourgeois and social democratic historiography which try to pass these events off as the eternal conflict between freedom and absolutism, or just another episode of East-West rivalry in a persistent historiographic framework which ignores the question of class.
In this sense we think it is useful to republish the articles and positions taken by our Party on the events at the time, which gave a timely reply to the analyses of the bourgeoisie and Stalinists. Before looking at our comrades' articles, we think it is useful to give a brief outline of the events about which they wrote on the basis of facts which were not available to everyone in 1956.
The Background
At the end of the Second World War the Red Army militarily occupied the Eastern European
countries wherever they had beaten German troops. All of them were economically backward in comparison to the rest of Europe (huge landholdings and poor productivity, little industry and almost no foreign capital, a very large handicraft sector producing very little) with a majority of the population working in the backward agricultural sector. In Hungary, where there was some industrialisation between the wars, World War Two brought enormous damage and destruction, subsequently made worse by the dismantling and export of a lot of precious machinery by the Red Army. The situation can be summed up in the following figures: whilst industrial enterprises were working at the lowest possible percentage through lack of power and raw materials, in agriculture (in 1946) production was only half that of the pre-war period, despite the efforts of small farmers who had sown 95% of the cultivable area.
In December 1944 the provisional government formed in Debrecen enacted a great agrarian reform which overturned previous land ownership, one third of which was in the hands of families who supported the Head of State, Admiral Horthy (1), the pre-war, pro-Nazi dictator. Landholdings greater than 54 hectares were divided amongst 600,000 poor peasant and farm labouring families who had until then made up half the population. In fact the repartition of the land came about through the initiative of the peasants, organised independently of the central government, in their own local committees. This had led to an extreme fragmentation of the parcels of land which was immediately felt as they were not big enough even for the subsistence of a single family. Under the pressure of the USSR and with the official sanction of the Potsdam Agreement (2), which, amongst other things, established that all German-owned industry should be shipped to the USSR, the immediate nationalisation of heavy industry began. The only sectors exempted from this (like bauxite mining and oil) were those where the USSR had a monopoly by forming parodies of mixed Soviet-Hungarian companies. The USSR had immediately imposed (1945) the heaviest reparations which made the burden of the agreement even heavier. As a result, a) the Soviets established the price of imports and exports so that Hungarians had to pay for primary products above Western market prices whilst they had to re-export goods made from these raw materials at lower prices than normal. And, b) the firms which produced for the war reparations account had privileged access to the primary products which began to arrive from the USSR. In a word, with the Potsdam Accord and the Soviet-Hungarian Trade Agreement of 1945, the USSR immediately started the blood sucking relationship which would become the basis of the formal relationship with all its satellites. In 1945 65% of Hungarian output was dedicated to paying "reparations" to the USSR. In 1947 this still represented 18% of the national budget.
Between 1945 and 1948 it was not the Communist Party which stepped into the limelight but the Popular Front consisting of the Communist Party (CP), the Socialist, nationalist and peasant and small landowners parties, the usual grand coalition of the bourgeois left and right which post-war reconstruction called for. In the elections at the end of 1945 the Communist Party garnered 15% of the vote.
But the bourgeoisie of the "classical" western type was weak and had partially fled abroad: decades of easy living under the Horthy regime had made it inept in the political struggles of the parliamentary type. Its own representatives in the coalition (the small landowners and a fraction of the National Peasants Party) had no clear or articulated programme. The other petty bourgeois parties were in fact prey to factionalism, in a political-ideological crisis and incapable of posing an obstacle to the rise of a CP helped enormously but not decisively by Soviet support. The 1945 election gave a majority to the small proprietors party, the only representative of the right allowed to take part in the elections by Voroshilov, the commander of the Soviet occupying force, who had imposed _a priori_ that whatever the result of the election the Popular Front Government modelled on that established in Debrecen in December 1944 would continue in power.
Thus the CP succeeded in holding onto the Home Office (Ministry of the Interior) led by Icore Nagy, and then in March, Laszlo Rajk (3), who soon organised a "state within the state" through a secret police modelled on the Soviet NKVD. And it was also under Soviet pressure that in January 1948 the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party expelled its right and centrist wings, including the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Anna Kethly and Industry Minister Antal Ban, and decided to fuse with the CP. The same fusions, though at slightly different times are to be found elsewhere, as in Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Such fusions gave the CP a governmental majority allowing them to strengthen their position in the state until they _de facto_ monopolised it. In 1949 the new constitution, based on the USSR's Stalin Constitution of 1936 was implemented.
In the initial period of its rise the CP was aided by the fact that the peasant and proletarian masses were pushing for radical changes as the nationalisation of industry and the banks, the anti-clerical campaign and the redistribution of the land appeared to be. But even in 1949 many illusions were beginning to collapse.
In August 1947 the first three year plan for investment and production, accompanied by the nationalisation of all commercial and industrial enterprises with more than 100 employees had already been launched. Its inauguration brought about the re-establishment of the rigid hierarchy between workers and management which had already been the pattern under the Fascist regime of Horthy. This time management was in the hands of members of the CP which grew in the meantime with the entry of profiteers and businessmen coming from other parties.
And the proletariat? The proletariat, after the defeat of the attempted revolution by the party of Bela Kun never recovered. The military defeat of Bela Kun (4) had made a shift to the right a lot easier, and so led to complete Stalinisation of the CP, whilst the Horthy regime made sure it remained in an economically dire situation. As it was mainly made up of agricultural workers at the time of "liberation", deprived as it was of its own political instrument, devoid of almost any reference to its own historic programme it was a defenceless victim sacrificed on the altar of capitalist reconstruction. Any reforms that gave the illusion of an improvement in conditions were easily accepted, especially as they were presented under the glorious name of socialism. The agricultural component was momentarily hypnotised by the redistribution of land. Increases (though hardly significant) in industrial wages also lulled the proletariat to sleep. The anaesthetising of the class was enough to ensure the basis for the rise of the CP, giving it political and, above all else, electoral support. Not a single proletarian body associated with a real revolutionary and socialist movement was established (not even in a lukewarm imitation by the political forces around at the time). Those which did arise in 1944-5, later lauded by Social Democratic commentators as organs of direct democracy, were totally different to the workers councils seen in the Russian Revolution and which would be seen in the Hungarian October of 1956. They were just the local bodies of the Popular Front appointed by the leaders of its constituent parties and thus their chief characteristic was to melt like snow in sunlight once the central government had taken logistical administrative control over the entire national territory. It would have been a totally different thing if these committees really had been true expressions of the rank and file of the agricultural and industrial working class, i.e. if they had been the product of the entry of the class into its own history and thus the bearers of their historic and immediate demands.
Something similar had happened in Spain at the dawn of the Civil War, even if in Iberia the proletarian tragedy was magnified by the combativity and direct involvement of the working class in those committees which the leftist organisations had set up. The ideological disaster was also complete in Hungary. The illusion that socialism could come about through the, more or less peaceful, conquest of power by a party which said it was the class party, the Communist Party, without any revolutionary mobilisation of the class in its own organs of struggle before and after taking power, had triumphed. But what did the victory of the CP, and the entry of Hungary into the orbit of the USSR really mean for the workers and peasantry?
Naturally the Soviet model had to be followed. Above all economic "planning", forced industrialisation, collectivisation of land, increases in production and productivity were the imperatives soon demanded by the CP. There really was no other option. Leaving aside political and economic subservience of the CP to Soviet Stalinism, there was also a compelling economic need dictated by the commercial and economic vassalage which the USSR had imposed on Hungary as it had on all the conquered countries. Steelworks operated with raw materials and coal from the USSR at very high prices in order for low cost steel to be sold back to the USSR.
This is just one example of the whole arrangement. Forced industrialisation, especially in heavy industry, collectivisation of the land (the first thing to be carried out so that ex-farm workers became small landowners and were thus very happy with their new "opportunity") had very high costs for the working class as a whole.
The standard of living of the Horthy years remained as did the dictatorship of the bosses, in order to increase the speed of work and lengthen the working day, with no increase in wages. Stakhanovism, exemplary communists and all the beauties of the Soviet organisation of labour were all now established by a dictatorship even mote pitiless than the previous one. On top of this, as exploitation became greater, the harsher the political dictatorship became, and the more widespread the torturing inquisition of the secret police. These are the characteristics which prepared the way in the decade before October 1956.
In February 1956 the CPSU held its 20th Party Congress, the congress which began de
-stalinisation. Had the Soviet leaders come to their senses regarding the "errors" and "excesses" of Stalinism in order to return to the principles and practice of a workers' or socialist state? Certainly not!. The errors criticised were those which were no longer part of economic policy and the excesses had been faithfully followed by the very people who were now criticising them, and who were the products of those errors. The principles and practice of a workers' state remained in the dustbin..., where the counter-revolution carried out under the moustache of Stalin, had thrown them. In reality the 20th Party Congress confirmed a new era in the history of the state capitalism of the Soviet Empire: economic planning had to be revised in the sense that investment in heavy industry was reduced and a new attention was given to agriculture. The strain of the first great push for industrialisation had ended and with it also ended the regime of political terror which had enabled it. An increase in consumption as well as in the circulation of money and commodities had also to mean a greater relaxation in everyday life. In the competition with the West the USSR could not remain as it was. This was the significance of the 20th Party Congress.
But a similar new era had already been inaugurated at the beginning of 1953 by Imre Nagy in Hungary. Succeeding Rakosi in the post of Prime Minister after the failure of his Five Year Plan, Nagy launched another plan which argued that small independent enterprises had to be supported, even those outside the agricultural sector, the extension of the great steelworks at Dunapentele was abandoned, as was the financing of heavy industry and the compulsion for landowners to join cooperatives. Furthermore the Nagy Government had robustly scaled down the tasks and activities of the AVO (secret police) closing its labour camps and eliminating many of the instruments of terror from the factories. The Hungarian working class had a little breathing space. However in 1955 the change in the Soviet economic plan led to a serious industrial crisis which led to unemployment. In March 1955 the meeting of the party leadership, which was still headed by Rakosi put him back in the saddle. To the proletariat this appeared like a return to Stalinism which Nagy had cherished the hope of getting rid of for good. The new plan did not differ much from that of Nagy, but its origins made it more clearly anti-working class in intent.
The 20th Party Congress legitimised the aspirations of the masses in liquidating Stalinism at its roots. But this was not what the newly converted anti-Stalinists in Moscow either could, or would, allow.
Chronicle of Events
28th July
_Poznan, (Poland)._ Workers in the Stalin workshops went on strike holding a huge assembly calling on workers in other enterprises, and later marched demanding, "it is our revolution, bread, liberty, democracy, down with the bosses". They also attacked the prisons and the office of the secret police. They are not content with throwing out some leaders in homage to the de-stalinisation orchestrated by Moscow but put forward their own demands. Bread, because the state capitalist regime didn't give them it, liberty and democracy, because the lack of them were the most obvious aspects of Stalinist oppression.
Is this too little for us to talk of a class revolution? Yes, but it is enough for us to talk of a class revolt which could grow. Freedom and democracy for the proletariat, self-organisation of the proletariat in order to administer power and the economy would all be necessary in a revolution. But this is a product of a political growth which can also be very rapid if, within the proletariat, there already actively exists its most politically conscious and organised part, its party. The objective conditions for a growth of the movement existed but what was lacking was the class party. However the proletariat had risen on its own autonomous terrain. The regime screamed of Western provocation and attempted to pass the episode off as the desperate act of a minority in the pay of America, but these were obvious lies.
The de-stalinisation campaign had been carried out in Poznan at the same time as new speed-ups of work were ordered and for the workers of the Stalin workshops there was a 3O% reduction in wages. The repression was very harsh; workers had to face armoured cars sent against them by the regime. The policy was the stick and the carrot. At the same time as this harsh repression the government announced that the immediate demands of the workers in the Stalin workshops would be satisfied and promised that the process of de-stalinisation would carry on. Drowned in blood the revolt halted, but the unrest continued. From July to October workers, and many of the youth, remained on a war footing. In October Khruschev arrived in Warsaw with 14 generals. There was a fear that the Soviets were about to carry out a coup. But the Soviet leaders had understood that the Polish Communist Party was still capable of controlling the situation and restoring order. This was because in the meantime it had been "purged" recalling as leader Gomulka. He had been expelled from the party in 1949 as a Titoist but opportunely took over on the 4th August.
The heroism and the mobilisation of the workers were not enough to break out of the cage of the state capitalist regime. But it was the first sign to the European proletariat of what the "socialist fatherland" was. It constituted a severe blow to the credibility of Soviet "socialism". European vanguards had to begin to draw the lessons. And this is what our comrades who wrote in 1956 argued-and which we reprint in the articles which follow this.
23rd October
_Budapest._ The Petofi Circle announced a demonstration in solidarity with the Poles. The Government had banned it but at the last moment authorised it. Masses of factory and office workers left work and joined the intellectuals and students who had called the demonstration. To begin with the march went smoothly. It seemed that in Budapest the main demand was to request the rehabilitation of Nagy who had been thrown out of office in 1955, and remained so, even after the 20th Party Congress which left a Stalinist gang in charge. The Soviets, in the holy name of party unity, did not feel like getting rid of the whole Rakosi, Gero (5) etc. group. This was seen by the masses In Budapest as another act of continuing Stalinism. Nagy had represented the "new course" of anti-stalinism before it had even been announced. It seemed therefore that the recall of Nagy could stop the movement. The same manoeuvre had already been carried out successfully in Warsaw. However Gero attacked the demonstrators as provocateurs and the demonstrators counter-attacked. A column from the demonstration headed towards the radio studios and tried to get in. The secret police fired on the crowd and the first deaths occurred.
During the night clashes continued, but the soldiers in the barracks armed the workers, amongst them workers from the arsenal. And the workers of Budapest were clearly the most important force in the struggle. Late in the evening Gero announced the recall of Nagy to the government. But the clashes continued, an obvious sign that the workers were no longer simply content with a change of personnel. The workers now advanced their demands and by continuing the struggle also drew in the intellectuals who until then had only demanded the return of Nagy. The workers no longer wanted to work at speeds dictated by the Government, they no longer were prepared to accept the orders of the party and the unions, those state agents who were the management of the factories. They wanted the right to strike which the regime had always denied (the virtue of living under "really existing socialism"!) and they demanded also the withdrawal of the Soviet forces of occupation.
24th October
_Budapest._ A real battle developed in front of parliament between those workers and youngsters who had received weapons on the one side, and the security forces and the armoured Soviet troops on the other. Radio Budapest announced that the Soviet Air Force had also taken part. The workers of the Cespel workshop formed the vanguard of the struggle and they moved the struggle on to the higher stage of insurrection when they called for a general strike.
In the evening the state radio called on the workers to resume work the following morning.
_In the rest of the country._ At Miskolc, at Gyoer, at Szeged and in other smaller places the workers immediately entered the struggle as soon as they heard news of the clashes in Budapest. Everywhere they formed councils and workers committees. It was the great new development which the Hungarian proletariat gave to us. The example set in Miskolc was important. Here all the workers of the workshops elected a council which immediately called for a general strike, except in the electricity supply sector, transport and hospitals and immediately sent a delegation to Budapest to link up with workers in the capital. They published a programme in four points:
* immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops;
* formation of a new government;
* recognition of the right to strike;
* a general amnesty for all insurgents.
Intellectuals and students had launched an initiative on the day before but by now everything was already in the hands of workers organised in councils. The official radio still invited the workers to return to work: it was a sign that the general strike was still solid, despite the fact that Nagy was now the head of the government.
25th October
In Miskolc the radio was in the hands of the workers' council and was already being listened to by the entire country. In one bulletin the council declared that it was for...
"a government where communists are installed devoted to the principles of proletarian internationalism which is first Hungarian, and which respects our national traditions and our thousand year past."
Something of a paradox to have internationalism mixed with nationalism? Not really, when we consider what had brought it about. This declaration was aimed at the USSR which, until then (and for how much longer thereafter seeing that it has lasted until today!), had dominated. political and economic activity in Hungary in order to suck it dry. At the outbreak of the revolt its political actions were of necessity confused, inadequate from a revolutionary point of view, but understandable nonetheless. What we mean is the development of an internationalist instinct to call on workers in other countries to carry out the very same revolt against the state, on the basis of a genuinely communist programme. This would have been enough to overcome the dangers container-in the reference to the "thousand year tradition". But the proletariat in Hungary was also politically and theoretically disarmed. It was certainly playing into the hands of those who could put the accent on the nationalist content of the movement; or for the Hungarian bourgeois-bureaucracy to achieve a peaceful compromise, or even for the USSR to denounce the reactionary nationalism which justified the intervention of the army to the proletariat of the other Eastern Bloc countries. In this sense in the end the Soviets even won in this way. But it was in the nature of things and in the nature of their movement that the Hungarian workers made that declaration on October 24th 1956, and it was enough to mark out the current movement as potentially subversive.
On the other hand the workers of Myskolc were not satisfied by the promises of Nagy who, the day before, along with Kadar, had announced on the radio that they had requested the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Nor did they agree with the nationalist leader's bringing into the government spokesmen of the reactionary party of small landowners. Kovacs and Tildy, "the small landowners", recalled by Nagy, were good representatives of anti-Soviet nationalist hate seeing that Kovacs had been imprisoned by the Soviets for "espionage" and that Tildy had been President of the Republic straight after the war! In an extraordinary bulletin of the 27th the Myksolc council stated that it had
"taken power throughout the entire county of Borsod. It severely condemns all those who want to describe our struggle as a struggle against the will and power of the people."
And it added:
"We have confidence in Imre Nagy but we disagree with the composition of his government. All those politicians who sold out to the USSR should not have government posts. Peace, liberty, independence."
The general strike continued. Nagy's measures could have satisfied the petty bourgeoisie of Budapest, and some of the peasantry, but not the workers, neither in Budapest, nor anywhere else.
On that very day the Csepel workshop workers declared in the Young Communist newspaper:
"Until now we have not had the chance to speak. We have learned, in these tragic times to remain silent and to tread with the stealth of a wolf. But stay calm, even we will speak out."
They had something else in mind - workers' self-management.
26th October
The various workers' councils had put out so many declarations and statements that the Hungarian trades unions, under pressure from their rank and file could, after three days of insurrection, do no less than publish their own declaration which we summarise at length here. Politically the unions demanded:
* an end to the struggle, a government amnesty and the beginning of negotiations, including youth representatives;
* a broader govemment which incorporated representatives of the unions and the youth with Nagy as President and the economic situation be open to a free debate;
* an agreement of aid to the people proven to be injured in the tragic clashes and that the same aid be extended to the families of the victims;
* the army and police are supported in the maintenance of law and order by a National Guard made up of students and workers;
* a youth organisation be set up with the help of the unions;
* the new government to immediately begin talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory.
Economically the unions demanded:
* the formation of workers' councils in all workplaces;
* the establishment of workers' management;
* the radical transformation of the planning system and the management of the economy by the state;
* a review of wages with an immediate 15% increase of those wages below 800 florins and a 10% rise for those below 1500 florins;
* a minimum wage to be fixed at 3500 florins a month;
* all production rates to be abolished except where the workers councils asked to keep them;
* abolition of the 4% tax on unmarried workers and on families without children;
* an increase in the very low pensions;
* an increase in family allowance;
* acceleration of the building of state housing;
* the promise made by Nagy to open talks with the USSR and other Eastern Bloc countries to establish economic relations based on mutual advantage and the principle of equality to be kept.
In conclusion the document stated that the unions should return to the way they functioned in 1948 and to call themselves "Hungarian Free Trades Unions".
It was a typical example of the behaviour of unions in the face of a situation where insurrection had already taken place. On the one hand they were under pressure from rank and file workers who compelled them to include in their "programme" the most immediate demands which the workers had already put forward without waiting for the unions. On the other hand they reformulated these demands with that congenitally reformist content which compromised with capitalism, and the regime which represented it. In short, the unions played their same old counter-revolutionary role. For example, lets consider the part of the document devoted to wage demands. They were a complete break with the previous pattern. Stalinism, like other capitalist regimes, promoted widely differentiated wage rates (in the USSR the wage range of industrial worker to factory manager ranged between 100 and 2000) with the normal payment to workers being in the lowest band. The October 26th document tended to demand immediately:
1. a reduction of wage range inequality;
2. the implementation of this demand through the immediate raising of the lowest wages whilst not altering the highest wages.
Here, it wasn't the unions themselves who were talking, but the pressure of the workers forced them to advocate these demands. We should stress here that the union document followed dozens of communications from the factory councils putting forward these ideas. Why did the unions take up the workers demands, denying their previous policies which had always accepted the establishment of wage norms set from above, and acting as accomplices of the state in getting them carried out? There can be no doubt, nor any debate about it. The reason was the need to recover their credibility amongst the mass of workers in order to control them.
The whole of the political part of the document expressed the union line at the time on the control and content of the growing movement of the workers in their struggle against capitalism. Even here the unions were forced to play the game of making concessions to proletarian self-organisation. This explains the paradox of the demand for a National Guard alongside the Army, put forward by those workers now in arms, not only against the Soviets, but also against the regime. All the rest, including the idea of preserving the army and police, takes us back to the perspective of stabilising the situation, making revolution unnecessary. Indeed, what is the sense of calling for the establishment of "a youth organisation" in, and with the unions, when the young are already organised in schools, political and cultural circles, and have demonstrated their capacity for military action which already presupposes the existence of rank arid file organisation? The only explanation is that they wanted the young to submit to the very institutions against which they were heroically fighting, naturally through .the mediation of the unions. And as to a broader government all they were asking for was a facelift for the regime in order for stability to be restored. They called for the struggle to end, but the government and the state were still in place. This meant that asking the workers and students to lay down their arms since Nagy already was _the_ government and they only asked him to broaden it.
In the early afternoon on Friday October 26th the street battles against the Soviet tanks raged again. The government, which maintained that it had already made enough concessions and that the councils, which had already expressed confidence in Nagy should obey it, issued an ultimatum that all arms should be laid down before 10.00 p.m. But on the morning of the 27th fighting flared up again. The official radio declared that those who continued to fight were "bandits" and would be treated as such. The security forces of the Hungarian regime were still to be found fighting alongside Soviet troops. In the night of _Saturday 27th and Sunday 28th October the insurgents attacked the main prison in Budapest and killed the two Farkas, chiefs of police under the ultra-stalinist Rakosi Government_.
October 28th Sunday
The revolutionary councils in the provinces have multiplied but these are made up of different layers of the population. The proletariat was a major component which tended to give its character to the movement but it did not lead it. An historic accident? No, the situation remained confused because the proletariat did not have the instruments to deepen the class character pf the movement and thus take on the leadership of the social movement: it did not have its class party, nor, and this is much more serious, had it maintained a historic memory of its own past experiences. The Stalinist counter-revolution which began in the second half of the 1920s, had completely wiped out any theoretical expression of the class programme, right down to its basic notion of the consciousness and memory of the working class, and of their vanguards in the struggle. And thus this allowed the Government, frightened by the extension of the struggle to the entire country, to accept talks with representatives of the students and agreed an armistice with them, even though the
